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The expansion of international trade has
provided considerable benefits to theUnited
States and its trading partners. Yet the
growth of trade also raises concerns about its
impact on domestic firms and their workers.
This study surveys the economic
research on the causes of expanded inter-
national trade, the benefits of trade, the
impact of trade on employment and
wages, and the cost of international trade
restrictions. The findings include the
following:
• Incomegrowthaccounts for two-thirds
of the growth in global trade in recent
decades, trade liberalization accounts
for one-quarter, and lower transporta-
tion costs make up the remainder.
•Trade expansion has fueled faster
growth and raised incomes in countries
that have liberalized. A 1-percentage-
point gain in trade as a share of the
economy raises per capita income by 1
percent.Global elimination of all barri-
ers to trade ingoods and serviceswould
raise global income by $2 trillion and
U.S. income by almost $500 billion.
•Competition from trade delivers lower
prices andmoreproduct variety to con-
sumers. Americans are $300 billion
better off today because of the greater
product variety from imports.
• International tradedirectly affects only
15 percent of the U.S. workforce.
Most job displacement occurs in sec-
tors that are not engaged in global
competition.Net payroll employment
in the United States has grown by 36
million in thepast twodecades,along-
side a dramatic increase in imports of
goods and services.
•Expanding tradedoesnot explainmost
of the growing gap between wages
earnedbyskilledandunskilledworkers.
The relative decline in unskilled wages
is mainly caused by technological
changes that reward greater skills.
•Tradebarriers impose large,netcostson
the U.S. economy. The cost to the
economy per job saved in protected
industries far exceeds thewages paid to
workers in those jobs.
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Introduction
America’s trade with the rest of the world
expanded significantly after World War II. U.S.
goods (exports plus imports) increased from 9.2
percent of gross domestic product in 1960 to
28.6 percent in 2007.This expansion of interna-
tional trade has benefited the United States and
its trading partners considerably. The benefits
include a higher standard of living, lower prices
for consumers, improved efficiency in produc-
tion, and a greater variety of goods.
The expansion of international trade raises
concerns about the impact on domestic firms.
In particular, many people fear that interna-
tional trade reduces job opportunities for
workers and depresses wages. These fears cre-
ate political support for protectionist policies.
However, international trade restrictions are
costly to consumers as well as producers.
A recent survey found that 59 percent of
Americans have a favorable view of interna-
tional trade,1 although survey trends also indi-
cate that a growing number of Americans now
view international trade less favorably. When
asked about their attitudes concerning the
expansion of U.S. trade relations with the rest
of the world, 36 percent thought it was “some-
what bad” or “very bad” in 2007 compared with
18 percent in 2002.
In this presidential election year, interest in
the international trade views of the likely
Democratic and Republican nominees is high.
A meaningful way to determine the candidates’
thinking on international trade is to look at
their legislative voting records.
According to the Cato Institute’s Center for
Trade Policy Studies, Republican Sen. John
McCain (R-AZ) voted against trade restric-
tions 88 percent of the time over his career.2 He
is classified as a free trader based on his voting
record. Sen. Barack Obama (D-IL) voted
against trade barriers only 36 percent of the
time. Clearly, the outcome of the November
election could significantly affect future U.S.
trade policy. Whether the United States con-
tinues to promote free trade will depend in part
on who is elected president.
Opinion surveys and congressional voting
records suggest Americans disagree strongly
about the costs and benefits of international
trade.This paper reviews empirical studies that
examine the evidence on how international
trade affects the economy. The goal of this
paper is to discuss the evidence with respect to
four important areas of international trade: the
causes of expanded international trade, the ben-
efits of trade, the impact of trade on employ-
ment and wages, and the cost of international
trade restrictions.
The following points summarize the evidence
from a survey ofmajor research in the field:
• Comparative advantage remains the major
driver of global trade flows.
• Income growth accounts for two-thirds of
the growth in global trade in recent
decades, trade liberalization accounts for
one-quarter, and lower transportation
costs make up the remainder.
•Trade expansion has fueled faster growth and
raised incomes in countries that have liberal-
ized. A 1-percentage-point gain in trade as a
share of the economy raises per capita income
by 1 percent.Global elimination of all barriers
to trade in goods and services would raise
global income by $2 trillion and U.S. income
by almost $500 billion.
•Competition from trade delivers lower prices
and more product variety to consumers.
Americans are $300 billion better off today
than they would be otherwise because of the
greater product variety from imports.
• International trade directly affects only 15
percent of the U.S. workforce. Most job
displacement occurs in sectors that are not
engaged in global competition.
•While trade has probably caused a net loss of
manufacturing jobs since 1979, those losses
have been more than offset by employment
gains in other sectors of the economy. Net
payroll employment in the United States has
grown by 36 million in the past two decades,
along with a dramatic increase in imports of
goods and services.
• Growing levels of trade do not explain
most of the growing gap between wages
2
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3earned by skilled and unskilled workers.
The relative decline in unskilled wages is
mainly caused by technological changes
that reward greater skills. Demand for
unskilled workers has been in relative
decline in all sectors of the economy, not
just those exposed to trade.
• Trade barriers impose large, net costs on
the U.S. economy. The cost to the econo-
my per job saved in protected industries
far exceeds the wages paid to workers in
those jobs.
• Protectionism persists because small,
homogeneous, and concentrated interests
are better able to lobby the government
than the large, heterogeneous, and dis-
persed mass of consumers.
WhyCountriesTrade
Comparative advantage remains the basis of
international trade. Differences in production
costs within countries determine much of the
flow of goods and services across international
borders. Economists use the term “comparative
advantage” to indicate that a country has a cost
advantage in producing certain goods relative
to other goods that could be produced within
that same country.3 In other words, what spurs
trade and specialization is not the absolute cost
advantage that one country’s producers have
over their competitors in another country, but
the relative advantage they have compared to
other sectors within their own country.
Consider the example of a more-developed
Country A and a less-developed Country B.
Country A may be able to produce t-shirts twice
as efficiently as Country B; but if it can produce
computers 10 times more efficiently, it will make
economic sense for Country A to specialize in
producing and exporting computers while
importing t-shirts from Country B.Trade allows
both countries to direct their internal resources—
principally labor and capital—to those sectors
where they are relatively more productive com-
pared to other sectors in the domestic economy.
Comparative advantage can spring from
multiple sources. A country can have a cost
advantage in the production of a particular good
because of superior production technology.This
superiority can include better ways to organize
the production process or a climate that allows
the country to grow certain crops, such as
bananas and mangos, more cheaply. It can also
include greater investments in skilled labor and
equipment that can result in a comparative
advantage in such areas as computer software.
The United States has proportionately more
skilled labor than unskilled labor compared with
most countries.4 This makes the United States
the low-cost producer for goods that rely on
skilled labor and sophisticated machinery.
Therefore, the United States exports high-tech
manufactured goods that can be produced using
relatively more skilled labor and imports shoes
and apparel that are produced using a large
amount of unskilled labor.
However, sometimes trade involves similar
goods.For example, theUnited States both exports
and imports golf clubs.This type of trade occurs in
markets where businesses differentiate their prod-
ucts and experience declining average costs as pro-
duction expands.5 In this setting, opening an econ-
omy to international trade increases the size of the
market. Average costs fall, resulting in lower prices
and a wider array of products being sold in each of
the trading countries. Consumers can select from
products produced by domestic as well as foreign
firms. Lower prices and greater variety increase
consumer welfare.
Global trade has expanded significantly since
World War II for a number of reasons, including
lower transportation and information costs, high-
er per capita income, and changes in government
policies. The containerization of shipping has
reduced loading times, improving efficiency, just as
less expensive air transportation has increased
international trade in perishable items. Improve-
ments in information technologyhavemade it less
costly for consumers to determine the characteris-
tics of products produced abroad. Information
technology has alsomade it easier for producers to
assess consumer preferences, allowing better cus-
tomization of products and services for buyers in
foreign markets. Income growth in developed
countries and even in some less-developed coun-
tries has increased the demand for goods and ser-
Global trade has
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vices produced domestically as well as from
abroad. Finally, trade restrictions have decreased
significantly sinceWorldWar II.
Evidence is now available that quantifies the
relative contribution of these different factors to
the growth ofworld trade.Scott Baier and Jeffrey
Bergstrand attribute 67 percent of the increase in
international trade to income growth, another 25
percent to tariff reductions, and the remaining 8
percent to falling transportation costs.6 (See
Figure 1.) Critics of trade blame trade agree-
ments for spurring global competition, when in
fact most trade growth simply stems from rising
global incomes. A reversion to protectionism
would not necessarily stop the growth of global
trade, but it would sacrifice the considerable eco-
nomic benefits of more open competition.
Benefits from
International Trade
Since World War II, multilateral and unilat-
eral tariff negotiations have reduced barriers to
international trade. Several attempts have been
made to quantify the resulting welfare gains to
consumers and producers.7 In brief, trade leads
to specialization based on comparative advan-
tage, which lowers production costs, allowing for
greater levels of output and, therefore, consump-
tion. Individuals are able to purchase products at
lower prices, resulting in higher real incomes and
a higher standard of living. In addition, trade
allows countries to import products that embody
new technologies which are not produced at
home.
One way to assess the gains from interna-
tional trade is to compare the level of welfare
(measured imperfectly by real per capita GDP)
before and after trade restrictions are dropped.A
dramatic example of this type of trade reform
occurred in Japan during the early 1850s. For
200 years up until then, Japan had almost no
economic or cultural contact with other coun-
tries. Then the Japanese government signed a
treaty with the United States that was designed
to shift the country from a no-trade to a free-
trade regime in seven years. Daniel Bernhofen
4
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Figure 1
Factors Driving Global Trade
Source: Scott L. Baier and Jeffrey H. Bergstrand, “The Growth of World Trade: Tariffs, Transport Costs, and
Income Similarity,” Journal of International Economics 9, no. 4 (2001).
67% Income Growth
25% Lower Trade Barriers
8% Falling
Transportation Costs
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and John Brown estimate that, with the increase
in international trade, Japan’s real GDP was 8
percent higher by the end of the seven-year peri-
od than if the economy had remained closed.8
Furthermore, by opening its economy to the rest
of the world, Japan was able to import capital
goods, new technologies, and new production
methods that promoted faster economic growth
and even higher living standards over time.
In another historical episode, the United
States closed its borders to international trade
in 1807 when President Thomas Jefferson
imposed a trade embargo to avoid conflicts with
the warring British and French navies.
Dartmouth economist Douglas Irwin estimates
the embargo reducedU.S.GDP by about 5 per-
cent in one year.9 Jefferson quickly ended the
embargo because of the high economic cost it
imposed on the country.
Research economists have used computer
models of the economy to capture the industry
adjustments and aggregate GDP gains from
trade liberalization. Work by Drusilla Brown,
Alan Deardorff, and Robert Stern represents
this type of study.10 They estimate that a one-
third reduction in agricultural, manufacturing,
and service-sector trade restrictions worldwide
would increase world GDP by $686 billion
(measured in 1995 dollars) over a prereduction
baseline. In the United States, GDP would rise
1.8 percent. If all trade barriers were eliminated,
world GDP would increase by more than $2
trillion and U.S.GDP would be $497 billion, or
4.8 percent, higher than before liberalization.
Although the association between free trade
and prosperity has been well documented, the
correlation between international trade and
increased per capita income has been difficult to
illustrate—perhaps because countries with
higher per capita income choose to trade more.
In a well-known study, Jeffrey Frankel and
David Romer examined the relationship
between international trade and per capita
income using 1985 data for a large cross-section
of countries.11 To deal with the causality issue,
Frankel and Romer used geographic variables
correlated with international trade but not per
capita income. This approach isolates the por-
tion of international trade not caused by growth
in per capita income.12 They found that, as the
share of exports-plus-imports toGDP rises by 1
percentage point, per capita income increases by
2 percentage points.
However, Frankel and Romer’s work has
been criticized because the geographic variables
they used may be correlated with other geo-
graphic factors that influence GDP. For exam-
ple, distance from the equator correlates with per
capita income, possibly invalidating the results.13
Marta Noguer and Marc Siscart used an
improved specification to reestimate the rela-
tionship.14 Controlling for distance from the
equator, they found that a 1-percentage-point
increase in trade share raises per capita income
by 1 percentage point. Noguer and Siscart con-
cluded that trade does indeed raise a country’s
standard of living.
More recently, Romain Wacziarg and Karen
HornWelch examined the relationship between
trade and economic growth for 133 countries
over most of the post–World War II period.15
Using country case studies and trade policy indi-
cators, they identified the year countries in the
study liberalized their trade policies.They found
that, on average, countries grew 1.5 percentage
points faster per year following trade liberaliza-
tion during the period 1950 to 1998. Focusing
on a subgroup of countries that had at least eight
years of data before and after liberalization, they
found 54 percent of these countries grew faster.
Of the remaining countries examined, 21 per-
cent did not experience faster growth while 25
percent of the countries grew more slowly.
Wacziarg and Welch found that the coun-
tries that experienced faster economic growth
maintained their liberalization polices while
the others did not. Also, some of the countries
that did not grow faster following trade liberal-
ization experienced political instability and
restrictive macroeconomic policies that hin-
dered growth in the post-trade-liberalization
period. Obviously, trade liberalization alone is
not always enough to overcome other factors
inhibiting growth.
Economists have also turned to individual
factory-level data to better understand the con-
nection between international trade and a
country’s standard of living.16 Looking at U.S.
5
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manufacturing data from 1987 to 1997,
Andrew Bernard, J. Bradford Jensen, and Peter
Schott found that a one-standard-deviation
decrease in tariffs and transportation costs
increased productivity growth by 0.2 percentage
points per year, primarily as a result of a shift in
production from low- to high-productivity
plants.Many low-productivity plants closed.At
the same time, however, exports from plants
already exporting increased, and high-produc-
tivity plants that previously produced only for
the domestic market entered the export market.
DanielTrefler found productivity gains of 1.9
percent per year inCanadianmanufacturing fol-
lowing the implementation of the 1989 free
trade agreement with the United States.
Average manufacturing employment fell by 5
percent in the seven years following the agree-
ment.Those job losses were disproportionally in
manufacturing plants that received the greatest
tariff protection prior to the trade agreement.
However, employment growth in more efficient
manufacturing plants helped to reemploy dis-
placed workers over time. These studies show
that the short-run adjustment costs and job dis-
placement associated with the closing of ineffi-
cient plants can be offset by greater productivity
and higher standards of living in the longer-run.
These estimates of the gains from interna-
tional trade probably underestimate the
improvement in well-being that increased trade
brings. Moving to freer international trade also
increases the variety of goods and services indi-
viduals can choose from. If consumers value
variety, then welfare improves in an open econ-
omy. This welfare gain may not show up in
income data, but it does make people better off.
In addition, greater variety in intermediate cap-
ital goods benefits producers. Better intermedi-
ate goods improve efficiency and speed produc-
tivity growth, resulting in a higher standard of
living for workers.
Christian Broda andDavidWeinstein exam-
ined the benefits of greater import variety in the
United States over the period 1972 to 2001.17
They estimated that the variety of international
goods imported into the United States tripled
over the period. One traditional measure of the
welfare gain from international trade is the
decline in prices as measured by an import price
index.However, Broda and Weinstein point out
that the United States’ import price index is not
adjusted for changes in variety. If greater variety
increases a consumer’s satisfaction and standard
of living without raising prices, then consumers
should be able to achieve the same level of wel-
fare while spending less. When Broda and
Weinstein adjusted the U.S. import price index
for changes in variety, they estimated the U.S.
welfare gain from a greater variety of imports to
be approximately 2.8 percent of GDP, or $300
billion per year.
These empirical studies provide evidence
that international trade raises income and pro-
ductivity. They also show that the greater prod-
uct variety brought about by expanding interna-
tional trade improves welfare.
Trade’s Effect on Employment
People concerned about trade worry that
gains in productivity and product variety come
at the expense of domestic employment.Yet, the
evidence shows little relationship between
greater imports and any change in aggregate
employment.18 Over the past 20 years, U.S.
aggregate net employment has increased from
102 million jobs to nearly 138 million jobs,19
while imports of goods and services have gone
from a little over $500 billion to $2.35 trillion.20
As shown in Figure 2, employment tends to rise
along with imports.21 Demographic trends,
worker education and skill levels, labor-market
regulations, and business-cycle developments—
not trade—are the dominant factors influencing
the overall level of employment and the unem-
ployment rate in the U.S. economy.
International trade does have distributive
effects. Although the country as a whole is bet-
ter off, individual groups of workers or indus-
tries may be worse off. This occurs because,
once a country opens itself up to international
trade, import prices fall because of greater
competition and export prices rise because pro-
ducers can sell to a larger global market.
Domestic production of import-competing
goods contracts while production in export
6
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industries expands, changing the real earnings
of inputs employed in these sectors.22
What are the implications for the United
States? As noted earlier, the United States
exports goods that use relatively more skilled
labor and imports goods that use relatively more
unskilled labor. As the economy adjusts to
changing trade patterns, the demand for skilled
labor increases and the demand for unskilled
labor decreases.Thus, as theUnited States opens
its economy to greater international trade, real
wages of skilled labor rise relative to the real
wages of unskilled labor.23 Makingmattersmore
difficult for unskilled laborors, displaced workers
may also experience a period of unemployment
before they find a new job.24
Researchers who investigate the impact of
international trade on employment and wages
find that, despite public rhetoric, international
trade has a relatively small impact on wages and
employment in the United States.25 Growth in
wage inequality over the last 25 years has appar-
ently been driven more by technological change
than international trade.
Two facts shed some light on this general con-
clusion. First, international trade directly affects
only 15 percent of the U.S. workforce. This sug-
gests that international competition is an issue for
only a minority of workers. Second, high rates of
job loss occur in sectors of the economy that are
not engaged in international trade, indicating that
factors other than international trade play an
important role in labor-market disruptions.
In addition, the decline in employment in
the manufacturing sector has been driven pri-
marily by greater labor productivity rather than
by growth in international trade. The net
employment impact of international trade on
manufacturing is small because the United
States is both an importer and exporter of man-
ufactured goods.26
In a series of studies, Lori Kletzer examined
the impact of increased imports on gross U.S.
industry employment.27 For industries most
affected by imports, she estimated 7.45 million
grossmanufacturing jobs were lost between 1979
and 2001, or 28,219 per month.This represents
a loss of 15 percent of all manufacturing jobs
during the 22-year period.
Kletzer points out that data limitations make
it difficult to determine if displaced workers
have lost their jobs because of imports or for
some other reason. Other factors, such as
changes in technology or consumer tastes, can
7
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Figure 2
Growth of Employment and Imports, 1987–2007
Sources: Economic Report of the President, 2008; Bureau of Labor Statistics; and U.S. Department of Commerce.
Payroll Employment
(millions, left axis)
Imports, Goods, and Services
($billions, right axis)
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also result in job loss. For example, high labor-
productivity growth has resulted in a long-run
decline in manufacturing jobs—independent of
foreign competition. These studies also ignore
the jobs created from exporting or from the
lower business costs that result from imports,
which can expand employment in other sectors.
The more important finding is the net effect
of imports and exports on employment.
Economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of
NewYork have estimated the number of work-
ers needed to produce U.S. goods—imports
and exports—with the difference representing
the net number of jobs gained or lost in the
goods sector because of international trade.
Because imports are greater than exports, the
calculation shows a net loss in jobs from trade.
For the period 1997–2003, they found that net
job loss from trade averaged 40,000 per month,
or 2.4 percent of total employment.28 However,
the study does not capture employment gains
in other sectors, like services, which result from
access to lower cost inputs and new technology
embedded in imports. It is important to recog-
nize that total net employment in the United
States increased by 7.2 million jobs over this
period, which indicates that job creation in
nonmanufacturing sectors more than offset job
losses in manufacturing.29
Trade’s Impact onWages
A more contentious labor-market issue con-
cerns the increase in wages of skilled workers
relative to unskilled workers. Is this trend the
result of changes in information technology, or
is international trade to blame? Most studies
conclude that international trade has played only
a modest role in rising wage inequality. The
empirical evidence suggests that skill-biased
technological change has had a bigger impact.
First, the demand for skilled labor has
increased relative to the demand for unskilled
labor in most industries, even those not heavi-
ly engaged in international trade. If interna-
tional trade were driving this trend, we would
not observe high relative demand for skilled
labor in all sectors, or in sectors that do not
engage in significant international trade.30
If international trade was driving the growing
wage inequality between skilled and unskilled
workers, then import prices of unskilled-labor-
intensive goods should be declining over time
and export prices of skilled-labor-intensive goods
should be rising over time as trade expands.That
is, import prices should decline as we replace
higher-cost, domestically produced products
with similar products produced at lower cost
from countries that have a comparative advan-
tage in those items. Similarly, export prices
should be higher in foreign markets because
those markets tend to be high-cost producers of
the products we export due to our comparative
advantage. Using aggregate export and import
price indices, Robert Lawrence and Matthew
Slaughter found this not to be the case over the
1979 to 1991 period.31 Their result is consistent
with many (though not all) studies that take this
approach. A few studies did find a shift in rela-
tive international prices in the 1970s, but they
still concluded that the relative wage change was
driven primarily by technological change rather
than shifting international prices.32
More recently, using a similar approach for
the period 1981 to 2006, Robert Lawrence
found a 12 percentage-point decline in the ratio
of blue- to white-collar compensation which he
attributed to greater international trade.Most of
the decline occurred during the 1980s, a period
of fairly stable import-to-export price ratios.33
The evidence from the 1980s is inconsistent
with the theory that international trade is the
primary driver of greater wage inequality.
Robert Feenstra and Gary Hanson argue that
the outsourcing of less-skilled jobs does reduce
demand for unskilledworkers in theUnitedStates
(lowering relative wages), but it is not the primary
cause.34 They examined the impact of this type of
outsourcing for 435U.S.manufacturing industries
from 1972 to 1990. For the 1972–1979 period,
they found that changes in wage inequality were
not related to outsourcing. For the 1979–1990
period, outsourcing appeared to explain about 15
percent of the increasedwage inequality,while the
introduction of computers explained 35 percent.
Expanding international trade can influence
employment patterns and relative wages in an
8
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economy. The evidence reviewed in this paper
indicates that trade is not the primary source of
U.S. job displacement or wage inequality.
Technological change and faster productivity
growth play the dominant role in these devel-
opments.
Cost of Protectionism
Countries can influence international trade by
using tariffs and quotas.The purpose of an import
tariff is to reduce imports and expand domestic
production in the protected industry.With high-
er output, industry profits and employment
expand.However, that expansion comes at a cost.
Domestic consumers pay more for products, and
domestic resources are used less efficiently.Down-
stream industries that would use imported prod-
ucts as an input face higher costs, lowering output
and employment in those industries.
Gary Hufbauer and Kimberly Elliott exam-
ined the welfare gains from the elimination of
tariffs and other quantitative restrictions in 21
major sectors of theU.S.economy in the 1980s.35
Perhaps the most interesting and striking result
they reported is their calculation of the consumer
gains per job lost if the United States were to
eliminate tariffs on an industry. They estimated
the dollar cost savings for consumers relative to
the total number of jobs lost due to the elimina-
tion of an international trade restriction. The
average for all 21 sectors was $168,520 per job
annually—far higher than the annual earnings of
an individual worker. The dollar cost savings
ranged from a high of more than $1 million per
job in the ball bearings industry to a low of
$96,532 per job in costume jewelry.For the sugar
sector, the figure was $600,177 per job. For each
job “saved,” consumers paid three times the aver-
agewage inmanufacturing. In otherwords, trade
restrictions impose costs on consumers three
times the gain to protected workers.
Why do these costly international trade
restrictions remain in place? The simple expla-
nation is that the benefits from these types of
policies are concentrated in the affected labor
force while the costs are spread out over the
entire population of consumers.36
Producers tend tobe a small, relativelyhomoge-
neous group. Often they are geographically con-
centrated. As a result, the costs per person associat-
ed with organizing and lobbying for protection
from imports are low. Because they form a small
group, the benefits per person (higher profits and
wages) from import protection are high.The bene-
fit-cost ratioorpayoffassociatedwith lobbyinggov-
ernment officials is high. Producers and workers
find it worthwhile to organize in order to place
political pressure on governments for protection
fromimports.Sinceelectedofficials are interested in
reelection, they respond by providing protection in
exchange for political support.
For consumers, the benefit-cost ratio per
person is low. Consumers are a large, geo-
graphically diverse, heterogeneous group. As a
result, the costs of organizing to lobby against
international trade restrictions are high.
Furthermore, although the total cost to con-
sumers of these restrictions is high, the cost is
typically low on a per-person basis. The bene-
fit-cost ratio or payoff associated with lobbying
elected officials is low. Consumers are less like-
ly to expend the resources needed to generate
political action in their favor. For example, in
the sugar industry the benefits per producer for
import restrictions are more than $500,000 per
year.37 For sugar consumers, although the total
costs are high, the per-person cost comes to
only $5 per year. Not surprisingly, sugar pro-
ducers actively lobby for import protection and
sugar consumers take few steps to oppose it,
despite the high total cost to consumers.
Conclusion
International trade has expanded dramati-
cally since World War II. Recent polls and
political rhetoric suggest support for continued
trade liberalization may be waning—and that
is of concern. A movement away from the rel-
atively open global trading system that is cur-
rently in place would impose significant eco-
nomic costs on the United States and the rest
of the world.
This paper has provided a comprehensive
review of the important empirical studies that
9
Trade restrictions
impose costs on
consumers three
times the gain to
protected workers.
TBP28_Revised:Mastertbp.qxd  9/26/2008  9:10 AM  Page 9
quantify the impact of trade on the economy.The
evidence is clear: International trade raises a
country’s standard of living. Lower prices on
imported products and greater product variety
enhance consumer well-being. Specialization
based on comparative advantage and increased
competition from foreign businesses improves
production efficiency, raisingGDP.Firms also get
access to foreign capital goods that often contain
new technologies, further improving productivity.
Concerns over international trade often cen-
ter on the effect on jobs andwages.The evidence
shows trade can result in the displacement of
workers in industries that must compete with
imports. However, the impact is modest relative
to overall employment growth. Although dis-
placed workers do face adjustment costs, overall
the United States has experienced robust total
employment growth in the presence of expand-
ed trade. Furthermore, studies show that inter-
national trade has a relatively small affect on
wages. Greater wage inequality has been driven
more by skill-biased technological change than
by international trade.
Although international trade forces significant
adjustments in an economy, as the evidence shows,
the costs of international trade restrictions on the
economy outweigh the limited benefits these
restrictions bring to import-competing industries.
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